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CURRENT LEGISLATION
Since the New York courts do not "strain for probate" 18 the
new rule will prove a welcome aid in expediting will contests here.
The old formula has been severely criticized as having no basis in
logic.19 A testator who is insane or unduly influenced is necessarily
unaware of either disability. It is imposing a great strain upon the
language to say that he "communicates" the "fact" of such incom-
petency to his attorney, since he neither knows of its existence nor
communicates it in confidence. Nor can it seriously be argued that
the testator intends that facts which will clarify the meaning of his
will should be kept secret. His very purpose in seeking the services
of a lawyer is that his will be so drawn that his wishes cannot be
disputed after his death. The conclusion is inescapable, also, that
knowing that probate is impossible without due execution, he cannot
wish the facts surrounding this act to remain undisclosed.20 It ap-
pears not quite reasonable that his attorney's testimony should ever
have been excluded.
LEON BRAUN.
POWER OF THE SURROGATE TO VACATE ORDER OF ADOPTION.-
The legislature has belatedly recognized the inconvenience attending
the restraint, by judicial rulings, placed upon the surrogate's powers
denying him authority to vacate an order of adoption issued out of
his court. An amendment to Section 113 of the Domestic Relations
Law now specifically provides that "The Surrogate may open, vacate or
set aside, an order of adoption for fraud, newly discovered evidence,
or other sufficient cause, in like manner, as a court of record and of
general jurisdiction exercises the same powers." I This legislation
was found necessary in spite of the broad powers given the surrogate
by subdivision 6 of Section 20, of the Surrogate's Court Act,2 which
permits him to "open, vacate, modify or set aside, or to enter as of a
former time, a decree or order of his court." The former rule,
forbidding the vacating of an order of adoption, or the setting aside
of a consent to an abrogation of adoption, resulted from the Appel-
late Division's view that an adoption proceeding was administrative
rather than judicial. "In both cases he (the surrogate), representing
the public interests in domestic relations, is approving a contract,
and his approval gives it the prescribed statutory effect, in the one
I' Taft, Comnents on Will Contests in New York (1921) 30 YALE L. J.
593, 606.
" Cf. 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §2314.
Ibid.
1 Laws of 1934, c. 368, N. Y. DOMESTIC RELATIONs LAW, art. 7, §113,
effective Sept. 1, 1934.
' Laws of 1920, c. 928, derived from §2481, N. Y. CODE OF CIvIL PROCEDURE.
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case creating the legal status of parent and child, and in the other
terminating it. The fact that in one case his approval is called an
order, and in the other a consent does not alter the nature and quality
of the act." 3
This position gains further support from the nature of the con-
tract of adoption. The status was unknown to the common law, and
is entirely a creature of statute.4 Although an adoption is often called
a contract, unlike other contracts, it requires the approval of a sur-
rogate as well as strict compliance with the statutory requirements.5
Between the parties there is no issue either of law or fact. The
surrogate does not inquire into the validity of the contract; the statute
requiring merely that his decision be dictated by the moral and tem-
poral interests of the adopted person. There are no parties in the
sense in which the term is used in other proceedings and actions.
There is no wrong to be remedied, and the rights and duties of the
persons before him are not determined by the surrogate, but by the
statute.
Under the Code of Civil Procedure the courts held that the
powers of the surrogate were strictly statutory. 6 In consequence it
was necessary to invoke the aid of the Supreme Court with its ample
equity jurisdiction to annul an adoption secured by fraud or which
violated other equitable principles. But the amendment of 1921 giv-
ing the Surrogate's Court general equitable jurisdiction in addition
to the previous grants of specific jurisdiction in equity, may reason-
ably be supposed to have removed that court's limitation in respect
to adoptions. 7 In the Matter of Ziegler," which affirmed the surro-
gate's refusal to vacate his consent to an abrogation of adoption, the
court appears to have based its decision on the very limitations which
the legislature attempted to remove in 1921. Mr. Justice Scott,
writing for the court, said, "We maintain some doubt, however,
whether the Surrogate had jurisdiction to maintain the proceeding
and to grant the relief desired. That court is one of strictly limited
statutory jurisdiction and has no general equity powers." 9 Whether
the court acquired the power by virtue of the 1921 amendment is
now an academic question. The amendment to the Domestic Rela-
tions Law has removed all doubt.
LEON BRAUN.
' Stevens v. Halstead, 181 App. Div. 198, 168 N. Y. Supp. 142 (2d Dept.
1917).
'ScHULER, DOMESTIc RELATIONS (6th ed. 1921) §719; see Matter of
Ziegler, 82 Misc. 346, 143 N. Y. Supp. 562 (1913).
'i re Thorne, 155 N. Y. 140, 49 N. E. 661 (1898).
' Matter of McDevitt, 176 App. Div. 418, 162 N. Y. Supp. 1032 (2d
Dept. 1917) ; Stevens v. Halstead, supra note 3.
'Matter of Van Buren v. Estate of Decker, 204 App. Div. 138, 198 N. Y.
Supp. 297 (3d Dept. 1923).
'Matter of Ziegler, supra note 4, aff'd, 161 App. Div. 589, 146 N. Y. Supp.
881 (1st Dept. 1914).
'Matter of Ziegler, 161 App. Div. at 590, 146 N. Y. Supp. at 882 (1st
Dept. 1914).
